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Accepting Justice Kennedy’s Challenge: Reviving 
Race-Conscious School Assignments in the Wake 
of Parents Involved 
Charles E. Dickinson∗ 
Imagine a different outcome in the famed 1954 desegrega-
tion case of Brown v. Board of Education:1 “We conclude that in 
the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’” 
is constitutional.2 Imagine that Plessy v. Ferguson3 is still good 
law: “we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even re-
quires the separation of the two races . . . is unreasonable.”4 Fi-
nally, imagine that African-American students score lower on 
reading and math tests than white students at every grade lev-
el. Now wake up. The former two statements should give you 
nightmares; the latter is reality.5 Today, in America, school se-
gregation is on the rise,6 and the achievement gap between 
whites and minorities is increasing.7 School systems have a 
choice: ignore the threat or counter racial segregation with 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2003, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. The author wishes to thank those who con-
vinced him that all students can achieve at high levels. Special thanks to 
Mom, Susan, Jimbo, and Mary for their unwavering love, Coreil for inspiring 
him daily, and Professor Myron Orfield for helpful advice and commentary. 
The author dedicates this Note to the Hon. A. James Dickinson, who lived to 
improve the lives of others. Copyright © 2009 by Charles E. Dickinson. 
 1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2. See id. at 495 (finding that the “doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no 
place” in public education). 
 3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 4. Id. at 550–51. 
 5. JONATHON JACOBSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EDUCATIONAL 
ACHIEVEMENT AND BLACK-WHITE INEQUALITY 32, 37 (2001). 
 6. See Jonathan Kozol, Still Separate, Still Unequal: America’s Educa-
tional Apartheid, HARPER’S MAG., Sept. 2005, at 41, 41 (describing the main-
tenance of segregated schools and the resegregation of thousands of schools 
across the country over the last ten years). 
 7. See id. at 54 (noting the widening achievement gap between African-
American and white children since the 1990s). 
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race-conscious school assignment policies that conform to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle Public School District No. 1.8 This Note pro-
poses a solution aimed at the latter alternative: school districts 
that value the benefits of racial diversity must adopt assign-
ment policies that broaden the concept of diversity, avoid racial 
quotas, and mandate informed reviews of the progress towards 
educational equity  
Districts nationwide have attempted innovative and prom-
ising race-neutral solutions to the segregation problem.9 The 
results have been almost unanimous: the best way to achieve 
racial integration is to implement race-conscious student as-
signment programs.10 Despite this reality, threats of litigation 
and the unsustainable costs associated with mounting lawsuits 
plague school districts implementing such plans.11 As a result, 
many districts have resorted to socioeconomic integration, 
which appears to increase student achievement, but does not 
free schools of racial segregation.12 Others have returned to the 
traditional neighborhood model, which assigns students to the 
school nearest their home.13 Still other districts have at least 
considered other indicators of various kinds of diversity, such 
as single-parent families and English-language learners.14 Yet 
again, the results are predictable: segregation endures race-
 
 8. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 9. See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 85 
N.C. L. REV. 1545, 1551–52 (2007) (discussing various socioeconomic school-
integration plans around the country). 
 10. See id. at 1555 (“By definition, there is no better way to ensure racial 
integration than employing race per se in student assignment.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Joseph Pereira, School Integration Efforts Face Renewed Op-
position, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2007, at A1 (reporting on a white parent who is 
considering litigation against the school district in Milton, Massachusetts af-
ter learning of the town’s plan for school assignments). 
 12. See, e.g., INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, THE CHOICE IS OURS: EXPANDING 
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL TWIN CITIES CHILDREN 34–41 (2006) 
[hereinafter IRP REPORT] (noting promising results in achievement gains ac-
companied by rising segregation in the Minneapolis public schools after im-
plementation of a socioeconomic integration program). 
 13. Eboni S. Nelson, Parents Involved & Meredith: A Prediction Regard-
ing the (Un)Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans, 84 
DENV. U. L. REV. 293, 306–07 (2006). 
 14. See Paul Diller, Integration Without Classification: Moving Toward 
Race-Neutrality in the Pursuit of Public Elementary and Secondary School Di-
versity, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1999, 2049 (2001) (discussing demographic factors 
that may benefit minorities in student assignment).  
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neutral school assignment efforts.15 
This Note details various ways to satisfy Justice Kennedy’s 
limiting opinion in Parents Involved to achieve the racial inte-
gration he and at least four other justices deem both essential 
to our nation’s moral and ethical obligations and a compelling 
governmental interest. Part I provides the legal background 
from the hopes of Brown in 1954 to the uncertainty of Parents 
Involved in 2007. Along this journey, an alarming social, politi-
cal, and economic environment has led to extreme resegrega-
tion and a growing achievement gap among white and non-
white students. Part II discusses the virtues and faults of 
various proposed and implemented alternatives to race-based 
student assignment programs. Finally, Part III urges school 
boards not to shy away from implementing race-conscious poli-
cies that address the concerns that led Justice Kennedy to his 
uneasy acceptance of the Parents Involved holding. By ignoring 
the early perception of the death of race in student assign-
ment,16 school boards across the country can avoid a debilitat-
ing shift in education policy that will further widen the 
achievement gap and deny millions of children an equal educa-
tional opportunity. Race is not dead, but the Court’s recent 
blow requires a renewed commitment to achieving the compel-
ling interest of racial diversity in K–12 public education. 
I.  THE FIFTY-YEAR DREAM: FROM BROWN’S PROMISE 
TO PARENTS INVOLVED   
Since Brown was decided, the Supreme Court has strug-
gled with its powerful mandate to end racial segregation in 
American schools.17 In notable decisions discussed below, the 
Court was unwilling to accept specific racial quotas at a state 
medical college,18 but it approved a limited policy that consi-
dered race among many factors in the admissions program of a 
 
 15. Cf. id. at 2051 (noting that race-neutral factors should not be consi-
dered the best or only solution to ensuring racial diversity). 
 16. For an example of such a perception, see William E. Thro, An Essay: 
The Roberts Court at Dawn: Clarity, Humility, and the Future of Education 
Law, 222 EDUC. L. REP. 491, 496 (2007) (arguing that despite Justice Kenne-
dy’s limiting concurrence, the Court clearly declared in Parents Involved that 
direct consideration of race is impermissible for school districts). 
 17. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 14, at 2001–05 (describing the line of cases 
following Brown that attempted to define the ambiguity around school dese-
gregation). 
 18. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269, 275, 319–20 
(1978). 
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state law school.19 The mixed jurisprudence led to the divided 
opinion in Parents Involved that ended the use of race in two 
specific school assignment programs.20 This latter decision pro-
vides the framework for all school districts that seek to counter 
racial segregation in the public schools.  
A. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT ON DESEGREGATION AND 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Brown set the standard for public school desegregation by 
famously overruling Plessy’s tolerance of governmental separa-
tion of the races.21 The decision heralded a new era of school in-
tegration and championed diversity over racial isolation.22 
However, the Court has since placed significant limitations on 
government policies that seek to increase diversity where racial 
disparities are not traceable to past, intentional constitutional 
violations.23 After describing the holding and legacy of Brown, 
this Section outlines the important distinction between de jure 
and de facto segregation in order to frame when a government 
can act to address racial segregation. Additionally, this Section 
examines two Supreme Court holdings in the context of affir-
mative action programs in higher education that define the 
government’s ability to promote diversity solely for its educa-
tional benefits. 
1. Brown’s Desegregation Inspiration  
After generations of slavery and fifty-eight years of “sepa-
rate but equal”24 legal status, African-American children in 
 
 19. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
 20. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 
2738, 2768 (2007). 
 21. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954).  
 22. See Daniel Gyebi, A Tribute to Courage on the Fortieth Anniversary of 
Brown v. Board of Education, 38 HOW. L.J. 23, 49 (1994) (describing a funda-
mental change in the spirit of the country after the Brown decision).  
 23. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495–96 (1992) (“Where rese-
gregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it does not 
have constitutional implications.”); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 279–80 
(1977) (holding that desegregation remedies must be related to constitutional 
violations). 
 24. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), 
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Based on language 
used in Harlan’s dissent, the holding in Plessy became known as the “separate 
but equal” doctrine. 
 1414 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1410 
 
public schools across the country had endured enough.25 Repre-
sentatives of schoolchildren in Kansas, South Carolina, Virgin-
ia, and Delaware challenged state constitutions and statutes 
that mandated segregated schools, arguing that separate edu-
cational facilities denied minority students the promise of equal 
educational opportunity in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 The United States Su-
preme Court responded decisively and unanimously. Despite 
purportedly equal school facilities, the Court denounced the le-
gal separation of children based on race.27 By declaring segre-
gated schools “inherently unequal,” the landmark Supreme 
Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education set the stage for 
the modern American civil rights movement and the wide-
spread reform of American public schools.28  
Over the next fifty-three years, school districts across the 
nation grappled with the legal mandate to dismantle state-
sponsored segregation in the public schools.29 Nevertheless, the 
legacy of Brown endures as a promise of desegregation, integra-
tion, and equal educational opportunity for all children.30 Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. praised the Court’s decision as one 
bringing “hope to millions of disinherited Negroes.”31 Unfortu-
 
 25. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 486–88, 486 n.1 (describing the equal protec-
tion challenges brought in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware).  
 26. Id. at 487–88. 
 27. Id. at 493–95. 
 28. See id. at 495 (“We conclude that in the field of public education the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”); Gerard Toussaint Robinson, 
Can the Spirit of Brown Survive in the Era of School Choice?: A Legal and Pol-
icy Perspective, 45 HOW. L.J. 281, 283 (2002) (describing Brown as one of the 
most well known and influential decisions of the twentieth century). 
 29. See Diller, supra note 14, at 1999 (describing the challenges in the af-
termath of Brown in public education); Robinson, supra note 28, at 284–85 
(discussing the “conflicting legacy” of Brown and the improbability that Amer-
icans will understand its meaning in the near future). 
 30. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. 
Ct. 2738, 2791 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that schools can seek 
to achieve “Brown’s objective of equal educational opportunity”); Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (describing Brown as the 
first in a “line of school desegregation cases”); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 
U.S. 430, 441–42 (1968) (finding that a school board’s desegregation plan in-
sufficiently addressed the high integration commands of Brown). 
 31. See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., HARVARD UNIV. CIVIL RIGHTS 
PROJECT, A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOS-
ING THE DREAM? 7 (2003), http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/ 
reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr., The 
Burning Truth in the South, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRIT-
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nately, his 1968 assassination prematurely ended his struggle 
during the Civil Rights movement, and marked the beginning 
of the end of his dream of racial equality in America’s public 
schools.32 
2. When Segregation Has No Remedy: The Significance of De 
Facto v. De Jure Violations 
Not all segregation violates the federal constitution.33 The 
Supreme Court differentiates between de jure and de facto se-
gregation according to whether the governmental action is pur-
poseful or intentional.34 In other words, if the government’s 
purpose or intent is to create racially segregated schools, the 
Court describes that action as de jure.35 While the Connecticut 
Supreme Court was able to find de facto segregation in public 
education to be violative of its state constitution,36 the United 
States Supreme Court has always required a showing of de jure 
segregation before the state may engage in otherwise imper-
missible race-based decision-making.37 This is true despite nu-
merous findings that minority students in de facto racially se-
gregated schools experience inferior educational opportuni-
ties.38 
The Court has previously permitted only two compelling 
interests that justify racial classifications: to remedy past dis-
crimination39 and to achieve diversity in higher education.40 It 
 
INGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 94, 95 (James Melvin Wash-
ington ed., 1991)). 
 32. See id. at 8 (noting the loss of momentum in the civil rights movement 
following Dr. King’s assassination, followed by presidential and congressional 
efforts to hamper the promising desegregation efforts in the years following 
Brown). 
 33. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495–96 (1992) (finding that the 
government may remedy the vestiges of segregation only if there is a causal 
relationship to a de jure violation of the law). 
 34. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (“We emphasize that 
the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto 
segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate.”). 
 35. Id.  
 36. Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1270–71, 1280–90 (Conn. 1996). 
 37. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. 
Ct. 2738, 2761 (2007) (describing the distinction between de jure and de facto 
segregation as “central to our jurisprudence in this area for generations”). 
 38. See Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REV. 277, 290, 290 
n.62 (2007) (noting the “immense” literature showing unequal educational op-
portunities for minority students still exist even after the end of de jure segre-
gation). 
 39. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). 
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has never held that these are the only interests that may be 
deemed compelling;41 however, the limitation of de jure segre-
gation has kept school desegregation efforts from reaching dis-
tricts that are unable to point to past, intentional or purposeful 
discrimination.42  
3. Walking the Fine Line of Constitutional Race-Based 
Affirmative Action  
When governmental actors classify individuals for unequal 
treatment based on race, the Supreme Court employs a most 
searching standard of review known as strict scrutiny.43 Gov-
ernment action may satisfy such detailed review,44 but only in 
the most restricted programs.45 The following two cases illu-
strate the narrow legal parameters of race-based programs to 
increase diversity in state-run institutions of higher education. 
The framework used to review these affirmative action pro-
grams is essential to understanding the limits of similar race-
based programs in K–12 public schools.46 
a. Bakke Declared Racial Quotas Unconstitutional  
In an effort to increase the representation of “disadvan-
taged” students, the faculty of the Medical School of the Uni-
versity of California at Davis instituted a special admissions 
program that set aside sixteen out of one hundred spots in the 
entering class for “minority” students.47 A white applicant de-
nied admission on two separate occasions challenged the spe-
cial admissions program as a violation of his equal protection 
 
 40. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). 
 41. See id. (refusing to limit compelling interests in racial classifications 
to remedying past discrimination). 
 42. See Linda S. Greene, From Brown to Grutter, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 
10–11 (2004) (noting that the limitation of remedies for racial discrimination 
to de jure segregation has kept Brown from reaching its fullest potential). 
 43. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995). 
 44. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (upholding the use of race in public 
law school admissions). 
 45. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269–70, 319–
20 (1978) (finding a public university’s medical school admissions program un-
constitutional to the extent that it broadly disqualifies nonminority applicants 
from a specific percentage of seats in the entering class). 
 46. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. 
Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that consideration of 
the racial makeup of public schools is permissible so long as it does so in a li-
mited manner). 
 47. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272–75. 
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rights.48 A divided Supreme Court held that a state may con-
sider race and ethnic origin in a university admissions pro-
gram; however, the Court found that the special admissions 
program at Davis went too far.49  
The Bakke decision contained six separate opinions with 
divergent viewpoints,50 but public and private universities 
came to rely on Justice Powell’s position approving a limited 
use of race to further the compelling interest in attaining a di-
verse student body.51 Notably, Justice Powell repeatedly em-
phasized the importance of diversity in our nation’s schools.52 
According to Justice Powell, achieving diversity requires the 
consideration of several factors, one of which is undoubtedly 
race.53 
b. Grutter Approved the Limited Use of Race in Higher 
Education Admissions 
In 2003, the Supreme Court again addressed whether the 
use of race in student admissions violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.54 The University of Michigan Law School implemented 
an admissions policy that sought to enroll students with “vary-
ing backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn 
from each other.”55 To that end, the admissions policy focused 
on each applicant’s academic ability as well as a broad notion of 
diversity in order to achieve a “critical mass” of minority stu-
dents.56  
 
 48. Id. at 276–78. 
 49. Id. at 320. 
 50. Id. at 269, 324, 379, 387, 402, 408. Justice Powell’s opinion announced 
the judgment of the Court. Id. at 269.  
 51. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (noting that admis-
sions programs across the country cite to Justice Powell’s opinion as the 
“touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies”).  
 52. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (“[I]t is not too much to say that the ‘nation’s 
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and 
mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.” (quoting Keyi-
shian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967))).  
 53. Id. at 315 (“The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest en-
compasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which 
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.”).  
 54. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311, 326–27. 
 55. Id. at 314. 
 56. See id. at 315, 316 (describing diversity as students with an ability to 
“enrich everyone’s education,” including students of different races and ethnic-
ities).  
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Under the rubric of strict scrutiny,57 the Supreme Court 
upheld the law school’s policy, which differed in significant 
ways from the policy at issue in Bakke58 and Grutter ’s compa-
nion case, Gratz v. Bollinger.59 In so doing, the Court affirmed 
that a public school has a compelling interest in attaining a di-
verse student body,60 and deferred to the law school’s judgment 
when it came to determining the kind of diversity necessary to 
achieve its stated goals.61 The highly individualized review of 
each applicant ensured a narrowly tailored, yet race-conscious 
admissions program that withstood even the strictest judicial 
scrutiny.62 By contrast, the Court noted that “[n]arrow tailoring 
does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral 
alternative.”63  
Finally, the Court limited the reach of its holding to a pe-
riod extending twenty-five years, noting that racial classifica-
tions cannot be of unlimited duration and still satisfy strict 
scrutiny.64 At a minimum, periodic reviews of the classifica-
tions are necessary to ensure that they remain narrowly tai-
lored to the state’s compelling interest.65 
 
 57. See id. at 326 (affirming that all government-imposed racial classifica-
tions are subject to the Court’s strict-scrutiny analysis).  
 58. See id. at 329–30 (contrasting the law school’s policy with that of the 
specified quota of minority students required under the unconstitutional pro-
gram at the medical school in Bakke).  
 59. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271–72 (2003) (distinguishing the 
University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program, which automati-
cally distributed twenty points needed for admission to certain minority appli-
cants, with the individualized review emphasized in Bakke). 
 60. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. The Court expressed in clear terms that re-
medying past discrimination was not the only permissible governmental use of 
race. Id. Additionally, the Court accepted that race still matters in today’s so-
ciety. Id. at 333.  
 61. See id. at 328 (noting that the Court has a “tradition of giving a degree 
of deference to a university’s academic decisions”).  
 62. See id. at 337, 343. “To be narrowly tailored . . . an admissions pro-
gram must be ‘flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in 
light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on 
the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them 
the same weight.’” Id. at 334 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)). But see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the majority failed to apply strict scrutiny to the pro-
gram by accepting the University’s assurances of constitutional validity of its 
objectives).  
 63. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. 
 64. See id. at 341–43. 
 65. See id. at 342. 
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy announced a deep 
skepticism for the law school’s “individual consideration” of ap-
plications, suspecting that race is indeed outcome-
determinative in the admissions process.66 Given the “corrosive 
category of race,” Kennedy detailed the heavy burden the law 
school’s consideration of race would have to meet to survive 
strict scrutiny.67 Despite his objections to the majority’s analy-
sis, Kennedy concluded by noting his approval of the use of race 
in the pursuit of student diversity.68 
B. SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
AFFECTING RACIAL DIVERSITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
American society has changed since Brown labeled segre-
gated schools “inherently unequal”69 and school districts na-
tionwide began the process of desegregation.70 While American 
cities remain extremely segregated,71 the Supreme Court has 
backtracked from its pro-integration decisions and presidential 
policies have turned away from desegregation efforts.72 The re-
sult was a return to the segregated schooling that left minority 
schoolchildren with the “devastating”73 effects of an unequal 
education.74 This Section describes the powerful effects of mod-
ern residential segregation on school segregation, and con-
cludes that reversing the latter must include adequate consid-
eration of the former. Noting the failure to change patterns of 
residential segregation, this Section discusses the negative im-
pact of school segregation on schoolchildren nationwide. 
 
 66. Id. at 389. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 391–94. 
 68. Id. at 395. 
 69. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 70. See FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 31, at 17–18 (describing the peak 
of desegregation efforts in the North and South during the 1960s and ’70s that 
began to decline during the Nixon era). 
 71. See Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between 
Residential Segregation and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795, 795–96 
(1996) (“To put it bluntly, neighborhood segregation . . . has been high, contin-
ues to be high, and can be expected to remain high in the foreseeable future.”). 
 72. See Gary Orfield, Turning Back to Segregation, in DISMANTLING DE-
SEGREGATION 1, 9 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996) (analyzing a 
general change in civil rights policies beginning with the Nixon administration 
and its Supreme Court appointments). 
 73. Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Conn. 1996); Nelson, supra note 
13, at 297. 
 74. See Orfield, supra note 72, at 2 (arguing that some such Supreme 
Court cases amounted to “resegregation decisions [that] legitimate a delibe-
rate return to segregation”).  
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1. The Strong Connection Between Residential and School 
Segregation 
Any study of school segregation must acknowledge its un-
deniable association with residential segregation.75 Research 
demonstrates that residential segregation—particularly be-
tween African-American and white populations—is persistent 
and severe.76 Moreover, commentators and judges agree that 
the underlying cause of segregated schools is the increasingly 
segregated housing patterns that leave urban school districts 
dominated by minority populations as white families continue 
to move beyond the grasp of intradistrict integration efforts.77 
This suggests that efforts to address school segregation today 
must take into consideration patterns of residential segrega-
tion.78  
2. Resegregation in Public Schools and the Student 
Achievement Gap 
As may be expected given the persistence of residential se-
gregation, more than fifty years of efforts to integrate our na-
tion’s public schools has not prevented resegregation.79 The av-
erage white, African-American and Latino student attends a 
school comprised of a majority of his or her respective race.80 
More than one-third of African-Americans and Latinos attend 
 
 75. See Denton, supra note 71, at 795 (describing residential segregation 
and school segregation as “inextricably entwined”). 
 76. Denton, supra note 71, at 797; see DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. 
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UN-
DERCLASS 221, 222 tbl.8.1 (1993) (detailing trends in residential segregation in 
major metropolitan areas).  
 77. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 222–23 (1973) (Powell, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (calling residential segregation the 
“root cause” of school segregation); Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and 
School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, supra note 72, at 291, 
314 (describing white suburbanization as the cause of school segregation and 
minority isolation in city school districts).  
 78. See Denton, supra note 71, at 818 (noting the strong interrelationship 
between residential and school segregation); Orfield, supra note 77, at 292 (ar-
guing that attempts to desegregate schools will be counterproductive if resi-
dential segregation is not considered). 
 79. See Liu, supra note 38, at 277–78 (showing statistics of high segrega-
tion rates in public schools); Nelson, supra note 13, at 298 (describing the fac-
tors contributing to the resegregation of public schools since Brown); Gary Or-
field et al., Better Than Expected, Worse Than It Seems, INSIDE HIGHER ED, 
July 24, 2007, http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2007/07/24/orfield (noting 
the rise of segregation in American public schools over the last two decades). 
 80. Liu, supra note 38, at 277–78. 
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schools where minority enrollment exceeds ninety percent.81 As 
a result, school districts across the country have developed vo-
luntary and court-ordered plans to combat the problem of se-
gregation.82 Often, these plans involve assigning students to 
particular schools with detailed consideration of the school’s ra-
cial composition.83 
Why should school districts care about segregated school-
ing? The rise in school segregation corresponds with a diver-
gence in student achievement between white and minority stu-
dents.84 Schools with high proportions of minority enrollment 
exhibit the devastating characteristics of failing schools: high 
teacher turnover, unqualified teachers, insufficient academic 
and institutional resources, and unsafe environments.85 The re-
sult has left minority students isolated in low-performing 
schools, and white students unprepared to face diversity in 
higher education and the workplace.86 Moreover, American so-
ciety and the courts have long recognized the immeasurable 
significance of integrated education beyond the obvious aca-
demic advantages.87 The role of the federal courts in approving 
 
 81. Id. at 278. 
 82. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
127 S. Ct. 2738, 2801 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing a “[n]ation on 
a path toward public school integration” through various measures). 
 83. See Orfield et al., supra note 79 (noting the prevalence of race-
conscious assignment policies). 
 84. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2821 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
“well established” evidence confirming the correlation between racial integra-
tion and student achievement); Liu, supra note 38, at 290 (discussing the rela-
tionship between racial segregation and educational inequity); Gary Orfield, 
The Growth of Segregation: African Americans, Latinos, and Unequal Educa-
tion, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, supra note 72, at 53, 65–67 (describing 
achievement inequalities associated with segregated schooling). But see Par-
ents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2777 (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling the social 
science tying segregation to low achievement “inconclusive”). 
 85. See Liu, supra note 38, at 290 (describing California public schools 
with ninety to one hundred percent minority enrollment). 
 86. See Orfield et al., supra note 79 (arguing that both white and minority 
students are less prepared for college after segregated secondary education). 
 87. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (detailing the 
virtues of public education to society beyond individual student achievement); 
Kevin Brown, Equal Protection Challenges to the Use of Racial Classifications 
to Promote Integrated Public Elementary and Secondary Student Enrollments, 
34 AKRON L. REV. 37, 68 (2000) (describing public education as “the one go-
vernmental institution charged with the selective conveyance of ideas to the 
young”); Brian Gill, School Choice and Integration, in GETTING CHOICE RIGHT: 
ENSURING EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY IN EDUCATION POLICY 130–31 (Julian R. 
Betts & Tom Loveless, eds., 2005) (noting that integration of students from 
diverse backgrounds is “one of the traditional purposes of American public 
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and even mandating desegregation policies in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s can be attributed to the failure of race-neutral 
strategies to integrate the public schools.88 In short, segrega-
tion solely on the basis of race harms students89 and is illegal 
under the seminal Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board 
of Education.90 
C. INVALIDATING A COMMONLY USED TACTIC TO INCREASE 
DIVERSITY IN K–12 EDUCATION 
In the first case to reach the Supreme Court involving ra-
cial classifications in elementary and secondary school assign-
ment plans, school districts in Seattle, Washington, and Jeffer-
son County, Kentucky, defended their voluntarily adopted 
assignment programs that aimed to integrate their public 
schools.91 In each program, the school district used race as a 
factor in achieving a desired racial composition of the student 
body.92 The plurality held that the plans violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and compelled 
school districts across the country to stop classifying students 
based on race.93 Each of the fractured opinions argued that only 
their interpretation of precedent could be faithful to Brown.94 
 
schools”); Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkani-
zation, Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781, 787–
88 (2006) (“[I]n addition to facilitating academic achievement, public schools 
are charged principally with socializing students to values of assimilation, na-
tional unity, and social harmony . . . .”). 
 88. See Diller, supra note 14, at 2001–02 (attributing the intervention of 
federal courts in post-Brown desegregation to the failure of “mere colorblind-
ness” as an integration strategy). 
 89. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (quoting with approval the lower courts in 
finding that segregation has a “detrimental effect upon the colored children”). 
 90. See id at 495. 
 91. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. 
Ct. 2738, 2748–49 (2007) (describing Seattle’s use of race as an “integration 
tiebreaker” and Jefferson County’s use of race as a plan to “facilitate integra-
tion”). The district denied Andy Meeks, a ninth grader seeking to enroll in 
Seattle’s Ballard High School, his choice because of his race. Id. at 2748. Crys-
tal Meredith wanted her son, Joshua McDonald, to attend school close to home 
when the family moved to the Jefferson County School District in August 
2002. Id. at 2750. Meredith’s first-choice school was full, and although her 
second choice had space for Joshua, the district denied his assignment because 
it would have had an “adverse effect on desegregation compliance.” Id. 
 92. Id. at 2746. 
 93. See id. at 2767–68. 
 94. See id. at 2767 (describing the debate between the parties over which 
side is more faithful to the heritage of Brown); id. at 2800 (Stevens, J., dissent-
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In the end, the Court declared unconstitutional a common tool 
used to achieve racial diversity in public schools.95 
1. The Seattle Plan 
Seattle sought to counteract the relationship between ra-
cially identifiable housing patterns and school assignment by 
implementing a racial classification in its school assignment 
program.96 The school district employed a choice program that 
permitted students to choose among the district’s ten high 
schools.97 In the event that a student chose an oversubscribed 
school, the district resorted to a series of tiebreakers to deter-
mine the student’s school assignment.98 Under one of these tie-
breakers, the district assigned students to their chosen school if 
the student would bring the school’s “racial balance” in line 
with a predetermined goal.99 To achieve racial diversity, Seattle 
labeled its students as “white” or “nonwhite” according to the 
racial group identified by the parent.100 If the parent failed or 
refused to identify the student’s race, the district affixed the la-
bel based on “visual inspection” of the parent and student.101  
2. The Jefferson County Plan 
In contrast to the Seattle school district involved in this 
case, Jefferson County operated under a desegregation decree 
until 2000.102 After the district court dissolved the decree, the 
school district adopted a voluntary plan that required all non-
magnet schools to enroll between fifteen and fifty percent Afri-
can-American students.103 Under this plan, space availability 
 
ing) (arguing that prior Court decisions were more faithful to Brown and that 
no member of the Court in 1975 would have agreed with the plurality). 
 95. See Orfield et al., supra note 79 (calling racial-diversity guidelines one 
of “the most common methods of creating integrated schools in districts with-
out court orders to desegregate”). 
 96. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2747. The courts never found the school 
district to have operated segregated schools in violation of Brown. Id.  
 97. Id. at 2746–47; Liu, supra note 38, at 278. 
 98. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2747. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 2746; see Nelson, supra note 13, at 314 (showing the goal of the 
Seattle plan was to “create racially diverse schools and to prevent racial im-
balance”). 
 101. Brief of Amici Curiae Drs. Murphy, Rossell & Walberg in Support of 
Petitioners at 23, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-908). 
 102. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2749. 
 103. Id. 
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and the racial guidelines determined by the district were the 
basis for school assignment and transfer requests.104 To achieve 
its desired level of diversity, the school district labeled students 
as “black” or “other.”105  
3. The Plurality Opinion 
Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion declared it self-
evident that the plans at issue were subject to strict scrutiny.106 
Under strict scrutiny, the Court recognizes two compelling in-
terests to justify the narrowly tailored use of racial classifica-
tions in the educational context: remedying past intentional 
discrimination, and diversity in higher education.107 With re-
spect to the first interest, it is essential that the public school 
previously employed de jure segregation.108 Here, it was undis-
puted that Seattle never intentionally operated a segregated 
public school,109 and once Jefferson County escaped the dese-
gregation decree, there was no longer de jure segregation.110 
The second interest comes from Grutter, which viewed institu-
tions of higher education as having unique characteristics dis-
tinguishing them from diversity interests in other contexts, in-
cluding elementary and secondary education.111 
Despite finding no compelling interests, the plurality ad-
dressed the narrow tailoring aspect of its strict scrutiny stan-
dard.112 Here, the Court again found the school assignment 
plans to lack constitutional justification.113 Specifically, the 
Court chastised the plans for being demographically rather 
 
 104. Id. at 2749–50. 
 105. Id. at 2746. 
 106. See id. at 2751–52. 
 107. Id. at 2752–53. 
 108. See id. at 2752 (“[T]he Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance 
in the schools, without more.” (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 
(1977))). 
 109. Id. at 2747. 
 110. Id. at 2752. 
 111. See id. at 2753 (finding the diversity interest in Grutter to be both spe-
cific to higher education and the distinctively broad-based result of a “highly 
individualized, holistic review” of each applicant). The school districts at-
tempted to raise a third potential compelling interest—“the educational and 
broader socialization benefits” of diverse schools—but the Court characterized 
this interest as simple racial diversity and not the broader diversity that was 
recognized in Grutter. Id. at 2755.  
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
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than pedagogically driven.114 In other words, the school dis-
tricts inflexibly tied their racial guidelines to the racial compo-
sition of the district as a whole and then argued that the 
achievement of the guidelines was a compelling educational in-
terest. Had the districts related their racial guidelines to stu-
dies showing maximum student achievement at those levels of 
racial diversity, the Court suggested the situation may have 
been different.115  
4. Justice Kennedy’s “Controlling” Concurrence 
In a decisive concurrence116 that guaranteed the plurality 
its five votes, Justice Kennedy limited the reach of the Court’s 
holding. According to Kennedy, a school district may pursue di-
versity as a compelling educational goal.117 The problem with 
the plans at issue stems from the inappropriately broad means 
employed to achieve this goal.118 In short, Kennedy believed the 
school districts’ rigid distinction between races failed to meet 
the heavy burden of crafting a narrowly tailored solution to the 
compelling interest of educational diversity.119 With that said, 
after insisting that state and local authorities are not required 
to accept the status quo of racial isolation,120 Kennedy con-
cluded by encouraging school districts not to shy away from the 
“important work of bringing together students of different ra-
cial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds.”121 Only in this way 
would the country be able to realize its obligation to provide 
equal educational opportunity for all.122 
 
 114. Id.  
 115. See id. at 2755–56 (acknowledging the assertion of educational bene-
fits of racial diversity but faulting the districts for not tailoring the plans to 
achieving those benefits). 
 116. See Orfield et al., supra note 79 (describing Justice Kennedy’s concur-
rence as “controlling” because along with the dissenters, at least five justices 
found a compelling interest in promoting diversity in elementary and second-
ary schools). 
 117. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 118. Id. at 2789–91. 
 119. Id. at 2797. In the future, Kennedy observed, school districts should 
consider a flexible evaluation of each student’s ability to contribute to the di-
versity of the school similar to the approach taken in Grutter. Id. at 2793. 
Kennedy argued that the Constitution sometimes requires inefficient means to 
achieve a desired result, especially where, as here, the easy solution poses the 
dangerous risk of labeling individuals according to a blunt conception of race. 
Id. at 2796–97.  
 120. Id. at 2791–92. 
 121. Id. at 2797. 
 122. Id. 
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II.  ALTERNATIVES TO RACE-BASED ASSIGNMENT 
PLANS FAIL STUDENTS   
If the school-assignment tactic of race-based classification 
currently employed by hundreds of districts123 is unavailable, 
districts that value diverse educational environments will 
choose between the undesirable alternatives of employing race-
neutral means to achieve racial diversity.124 Numerous propos-
als have emerged, each with an inventive, arguably circuitous, 
and dead-end track towards the same goal that race-based pro-
grams address directly. This Section primarily addresses two 
such proposals: the increasingly popular socioeconomic school 
integration plans, and the traditional neighborhood, geography-
based assignments. However, not all integration strategies are 
mutually exclusive, and multiple, concurrent approaches to at-
taining racial diversity warrant exploration. Accordingly, this 
Section also discusses various strategies that may be partial so-
lutions to the race-neutral integration puzzle. This Section con-
cludes that all such race-neutral strategies insufficiently coun-
ter the dangerous rise in school segregation.  
A. THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL SEGREGATION UNDER CLASS-
BASED SOLUTIONS 
One of the most frequently discussed and implemented 
plans to achieve racial integration in K–12 public schools 
through race-neutral means is socioeconomic school integra-
tion.125 These proposals seek to assign students on the basis of 
their families’ economic status so that all schools are composed 
of predominantly middle-class families.126 Some proponents be-
lieve that eliminating high-poverty schools will ensure high le-
vels of student achievement given the numerous pedagogical 
 
 123. See Linda Shaw, Will Income Be the Next Tiebreaker for Schools?, 
SEATTLE TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A1 (describing the Parents Involved deci-
sion’s potential impact on hundreds of school systems around the country). 
 124. See Diller, supra note 14, at 2051 (“[I]t is questionable whether [non-
racial demographic characteristics] can ensure the same level of minority re-
presentation as a system that relies on racial classifications.”); Kahlenberg, 
supra note 9, at 1555 (“By definition, there is no better way to ensure racial 
integration than employing race per se in student assignment.”).  
 125. See, e.g., Kahlenberg, supra note 9, at 1551 (describing a recent rise in 
the national awareness of socioeconomic school-integration policies). 
 126. See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MID-
DLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 2 (Brookings Institu-
tion Press 2001) (calling for a fundamental change in school assignment poli-
cies with the goal of having all schools be “middle-class schools”). 
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advantages enjoyed by students in middle-class schools.127 
Scholars have further argued that economic diversity actually 
contributes more to student achievement than racial diversity, 
and that seeking economic diversity will improve both the 
school’s racial profile and its level of student learning.128 Others 
argue that assigning students to particular schools on the basis 
of their families’ economic status will naturally achieve a bene-
ficial level of racial diversity in addition to potential achieve-
ment gains.129 No matter the reasoning, approximately forty 
American school districts already employ economic factors in 
their assignment processes today, and that number is likely to 
grow given the numerous arguments in support of socioeconom-
ic school integration.130 
The arguments for socioeconomic integration plans are 
likely to gain traction among wary school districts in the wake 
of Parents Involved.131 Rather than face the inevitable litigation 
encouraged by the high standard of strict scrutiny that racial 
classifications confront, socioeconomic school integration 
presents an arguably easier legal solution by using poverty as a 
proxy for race.132 Ideally, class-based preferences divide school 
 
 127. See, e.g., Kahlenberg, supra note 9, at 1549 (citing statistics showing 
greater achievement by low-income students in middle-class schools than 
middle-class students in high-poverty schools, and attributing this difference 
in part to the high standards, quality teachers, active parents, and safe envi-
ronments more common in middle-class schools). 
 128. See, e.g., John Charles Boger, Education’s “Perfect Storm”? Racial Re-
segregation, High-Stakes Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of 
North Carolina, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1375, 1416–21 (2003) (describing evidence 
showing that socioeconomic status has a stronger relationship to student 
achievement than racial composition does); Kahlenberg, supra note 9, at 1558 
(arguing that socioeconomic integration is “more effective than racial integra-
tion at improving academic achievement of poorer students”). 
 129. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1039, 1042 (1998) (noting that some support for socioeconomic diversity re-
lates to the belief that class-based preferences automatically give rise to racial 
diversity given the disproportionate percentage of minorities that are poor). 
 130. See Kahlenberg, supra note 9, at 1551 (discussing various socioeco-
nomic school-integration plans around the country).  
 131. See id. at 1554 (arguing for socioeconomic school integration in order 
to avoid the “tough standard of ‘strict scrutiny’” that racial classifications 
face).  
 132. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND 
THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 30 (2006), http://www 
.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/Racial_Transformation.pdf (describ-
ing data that show a vast difference between minority and white students who 
come from low-income families). But see RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, RESCUING 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: PROFILES OF TWELVE SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
PURSUING SOCIOECONOMIC SCHOOL INTEGRATION 11 (2007), http://www.tcf 
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districts across racial lines.133 Since the Supreme Court em-
ploys the more lenient rational basis standard when the gov-
ernment regulates on the basis of economic status,134 the feasi-
bility of socioeconomic school integration is likely to attract 
more adherents. 
The results of efforts to diversify based on socioeconomic 
class have not been without successes and failures.135 The fol-
lowing sections analyze the impact of school assignment plans 
that consider socioeconomic factors in Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
Wake County, North Carolina; and Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
1. Minnesota’s “The Choice Is Yours” Program 
Alleging that de facto racial and economic segregation vi-
olated the Minnesota Constitution, the Minneapolis NAACP 
chapter sued the state in 1995 seeking to integrate Minneapolis 
public schools with those in the nearby suburbs.136 Several 
years later, the parties settled the lawsuit and agreed, among 
other provisions, to establish The Choice Is Yours (CIY) pro-
gram with the aim of furthering the socioeconomic integration 
of the Minneapolis and surrounding suburban school sys-
tems.137 With that goal in mind, the State agreed to provide 
access for low-income Minneapolis students to attend suburban 
schools.138 
 
.org/publications/education/districtprofiles.pdf (arguing income was not a 
proxy for race in Wake County, North Carolina, but rather race was a proxy 
for income).  
 133. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 132, at 11 (presenting the argument 
that class-based preferences may achieve greater racial diversity than other 
policies). 
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 
(1938) (upholding regulation on the shipment of filled milk as “regulation af-
fecting ordinary commercial transactions” . . . “rest[ing] on some rational ba-
sis”). 
 135. See Diller, supra note 14, at 2049 (finding “the record of success . . . 
mixed” when it comes to using race-neutral classifications to achieve integra-
tion).  
 136. See Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection, and Metropolitan Inte-
gration: The Hope of the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24 LAW & IN-
EQ. 269, 313 (2006) (describing the two cases, later consolidated, against the 
state of Minnesota).  
 137. Kahlenberg, supra note 9, at 1586–87.  
 138. See Orfield, supra note 136, at 314 (describing the “three key pro-
grams” of the settlement agreement). Minnesota’s existing interdistrict trans-
fer law permitted school children to transfer outside of their home district, but 
families were required to pay for the transportation costs. Id. at 315.  
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CIY has been a success on many levels. First, the number 
of students participating has tripled from 558 in the 2001–2002 
school year to 1,680 in the 2005–2006 school year.139 These ris-
ing numbers may indicate that families see CIY as a better al-
ternative to the status quo. Second, and perhaps most impor-
tant, a recent report commissioned by the Minnesota 
Department of Education showed appreciable gains in student 
achievement among participating students at the program’s in-
ception.140 Student academic achievement is obviously a signifi-
cant component of public education, but other goals such as cul-
tivating good citizens and preparing children for the workforce 
are equally important.141 Third, a majority of the participating 
students in the first three years of the program came from 
schools in the most racially isolated areas of Minneapolis.142  
However, the failures of CIY are equally notable. Most sig-
nificantly, CIY has failed to racially integrate either the Min-
neapolis or nearby suburban school systems. In fact, segrega-
tion in those districts has significantly increased.143 Moreover, 
 
 139. IRP REPORT, supra note 12, at 42. 
 140. ASPEN ASSOCS., MINNESOTA VOLUNTARY PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 
2004–2005, EVALUATION REPORT (2006); see also Kahlenberg, supra note 9, at 
1587 (describing the ASPEN report’s findings of significant gains in reading 
and math). But see ASPEN ASSOCS., MINNESOTA VOLUNTARY PUBLIC SCHOOL 
CHOICE 2006–2007, EVALUATION REPORT (2008) [hereinafter ASPEN ASSOCS. 
(2008)] (reporting that, for the most part, students participating in the pro-
gram performed as well as those who were eligible but chose not to partici-
pate).  
 141. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (detailing the 
virtues of public education to society beyond individual student achievement); 
Brown, supra note 87, at 68 (describing public education as “the one govern-
mental institution charged with the selective conveyance of ideas to the 
young”); Gill, supra note 87, at 130–31 (noting that integration of students 
from diverse backgrounds is “one of the traditional purposes of American pub-
lic schools”); Siegel, supra note 87, at 787–88 (“[I]n addition to facilitating aca-
demic achievement, public schools are charged principally with socializing 
students to values of assimilation, national unity, and social harmony . . . .”). 
 142. See Orfield, supra note 136, at 315–16 (discussing the ASPEN study’s 
showing of 52% of CIY participants coming from zip codes in north Minneapo-
lis). 
 143. See IRP REPORT, supra note 12, at 36 (“The result [of the settlement 
agreement] is more, not less, segregation in the Minneapolis Public Schools—
and rapidly increasing segregation in a number of suburban districts.”). The 
percentage of Minneapolis public schools with a population of 81–100% non-
white students has increased from 35% of schools just before the settlement to 
46% of schools in the 2002–2003 school year. Id. at 36 tbl.4-1. The IRP Report 
considers the program “promising” but not broad enough in its early stages to 
adequately cure the segregation and achievement challenges of the Minneapo-
lis Public Schools. Id. at 36. 
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the demonstrated increases in achievement of CIY participants 
are potentially misleading given the sparse data available on 
the relative achievement of students remaining in Minneapolis 
public schools.144 At best, these results warrant further study of 
a broader data set to determine the correlation, if any, between 
the increases in achievement and socioeconomic integration. 
Finally, to the extent CIY does improve public education in 
Minneapolis and the surrounding suburbs, the program is li-
mited to a small fraction of students145 in an increasingly se-
gregated school system.146  
2. Wake County, North Carolina 
On January 10, 2000, the School Board of the Wake Coun-
ty Public School System adopted a socioeconomic integration 
plan to replace a program that aimed for a minority population 
between fifteen and forty-five percent in each school of the 
120,000 student system.147 Wake County had a long history of 
race-based, voluntary school desegregation.148 However, since 
the Fourth Circuit recently found the use of race in student as-
signment to be unconstitutional, Wake County attempted to 
 
 144. See Orfield, supra note 136, at 317 (commenting on the lack of com-
parative data available on achievement changes between CIY students and 
Minneapolis public school students); see also ASPEN ASSOCS. (2008), supra 
note 140. 
 145. While there were only 1489 enrolled students in CIY at the start of 
the 2004–2005 school year, the Minneapolis school system served over 39,000 
students. IRP REPORT, supra note 12, at 42 tbl.4-5; MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS, PERIOD ENROLLMENT REPORT 4 (2005), available at http:// 
studentaccounting.mpls.k12.mn.us/sites/c1e62c01-fc16-4ce9-ae5b- 
4c1d51297a8b/uploads/PE_Oct_1.pdf; see also Jean Hopfensperger, Minnesota 
Ahead of Curve on Integration, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., July 8, 2007, at 1B 
(quoting Myron Orfield, director of the University of Minnesota’s Institute on 
Race and Poverty, saying that the bad news about Minnesota’s integration ef-
forts is that the data are inconclusive and “only a very small percentage of 
kids are involved in them”). 
 146. See David Peterson, State’s Schools Rank Second in Racial Change, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Aug. 31, 2007, at 1B (“‘We went from nine schools in 
the metro area being mostly minority in 1992, to more than 100 ten years lat-
er.’” (quoting Myron Orfield)). 
 147. Susan Leigh Flinspach & Karen E. Banks, Moving Beyond Race: So-
cioeconomic Diversity as a Race-Neutral Approach to Desegregation in the 
Wake County Schools, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN 
BACK? 261, 261 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005); KAHLENBERG, 
supra note 132, at 10–12.  
 148. See Flinspach & Banks, supra note 147, at 261 (noting the county’s 
history of desegregation efforts and describing previous school-integration 
programs as “[school] board initiated rather than court ordered”). 
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avoid litigation by adopting a race-neutral program.149 Under 
the new plan, the county set a goal that all schools maintain a 
student population of no more than forty-percent free-or re-
duced-price-lunch-eligible students and no more than twenty-
five percent reading below grade level.150 
The effects of the Wake County socioeconomic integration 
program appear promising. Many of the magnet schools—
which opened in low-income areas in Raleigh under previous 
race-based integration programs—exhibit extremely high popu-
larity.151 Among all high schools in the district, Wake County 
students perform better on standardized tests and graduation 
rates than other districts in North Carolina that do not attempt 
to integrate based on economic class.152 These higher achieve-
ment rates are consistent across race and socioeconomic sta-
tus.153  
However, like the CIY plan in Minnesota, Wake County’s 
efforts have failed to increase racial diversity.154 After years of 
dedicated, voluntary policies aimed at racial integration, the 
district’s leaders have abandoned official efforts to achieve any 
sort of racial diversity.155 The results are predictable: the per-
centage of desegregated schools has dropped or remained stag-
nant since the implementation of the new socioeconomic “inte-
gration” program in 2000.156 Despite achievement levels that 
 
 149. See Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 
F.3d 123, 124 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the school system’s transfer policy 
that may deny a student’s request to transfer on the basis of race violated 
equal protection); KAHLENBERG, supra note 132, at 10 (linking the Fourth Cir-
cuit decision with Wake County officials’ consideration of a race-neutral poli-
cy).  
 150. KAHLENBERG, supra note 132, at 11–12.  
 151. See Kahlenberg, supra note 9, at 1552–53 (describing the use of mag-
net schools in Wake County and noting that several are oversubscribed, caus-
ing denials of more than half the applications in 2004–05).  
 152. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 132, at 13 (listing the results of the 2006 
High School End of Course Exams and the 2002–03 on-time graduation rates). 
 153. See id. (showing that both low-income and minority students as well 
as middle-class and white students in Wake County outscored their peers in 
several other North Carolina districts). 
 154. See id. (noting that the socioeconomic policy is achieving desegrega-
tion at a rate lower than under the race-based program).  
 155. See Flinspach & Banks, supra note 147, at 273, 275 (stating that de-
spite an alleged desire to maintain diversity, the “commitment to desegregated 
schools has disappeared” and school officials have ceased to monitor racial 
enrollments). 
 156. See id. at 275 (reporting a drop in the number of desegregated schools 
in the first year of the new Wake County integration program from 64.6% to 
60.0%, and an increase back to 63.3% the following year). 
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surpass those of several other districts, Wake County is unable 
to present evidence that its school assignment plan improves 
the overall quality of education for its students. 
3. Cambridge, Massachusetts 
In 2002, after twenty years of voluntary race-based dese-
gregation, Cambridge, Massachusetts, eliminated references to 
race in its school assignment policies and instituted a plan fo-
cused on socioeconomic status as the primary criterion for edu-
cational diversity.157 The goal of the Cambridge plan was for all 
schools to have similar proportions of students eligible for free 
or reduced-price lunch.158 The school board phased the plan in-
to Cambridge’s existing “Controlled Choice” program, which al-
lows parents to rank their top choices among all the district’s 
schools, each of which has a unique pedagogical philosophy.159 
Cambridge designed Controlled Choice to avoid the desegrega-
tion problems facing its neighbors in Boston by promoting a ra-
cial balance in the student population of each school.160 The 
district’s new socioeconomic integration focus drastically al-
tered that original intent.161 
Early results of Cambridge’s policy are mixed. On the one 
hand, proponents of socioeconomic integration cite data show-
ing high levels of student achievement among Cambridge stu-
dents as compared to students across Massachusetts.162 On the 
other hand, Cambridge appears to be racially re-segregating, 
which led the Cambridge school superintendent to conclude 
that socioeconomic diversity alone is an insufficient goal of a 
 
 157. Tracy Jan, An Imbalance Grows in Cambridge Schools, BOSTON 
GLOBE, July 23, 2007, at A1; see Edward B. Fiske, Controlled Choice in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, in DIVIDED WE FAIL: COMING TOGETHER THROUGH 
PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 193 (Century Found. Task Force on the Common Sch. 
ed., 2002) (noting specifically that school officials will no longer even discuss 
race when talking about Controlled Choice). 
 158. Kahlenberg, supra note 9, at 1553. 
 159. Id. 
 160. KAHLENBERG, supra note 132, at 28.  
 161. See id. (noting the change in focus of the program from race to family 
income). 
 162. See id. at 33 (citing data of the Massachusetts Comprehensive As-
sessment System for Grade 3 Reading in the 2005–06 school year where low-
income third graders scored a 75.8 compared to 71.3 for low-income third 
graders statewide). Of course, this information does not show that the socioe-
conomic integration policy has caused student achievement to improve in 
Cambridge. Rather, snapshot samples of select indicators show that Cam-
bridge students fair slightly better than students statewide. Id. 
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school system.163 More time may be necessary to accurately re-
late the new policy with student achievement and racial diver-
sity, but the current trends are not unequivocally positive.  
B. RELIANCE ON HOUSING PATTERNS THROUGH THE 
NEIGHBORHOOD MODEL 
A second race-neutral assignment possibility—the neigh-
borhood model—has perhaps the broadest appeal for obvious 
reasons: it is easiest to send students to the school nearest their 
home.164 Additionally, it avoids the need to bus students to far-
away districts that has been so controversial.165 Of course, the 
neighborhood model by its very nature fails to address any as-
pect of diversity beyond what naturally exists in our communi-
ties. Nor does it attempt to correlate school demographics with 
student achievement, an association that social scientists have 
demonstrated for decades.166 Rather, the neighborhood model 
permits housing patterns to dictate the make-up of public 
schools.167 With the rise in housing segregation in America, the 
neighborhood model is a recipe for failure.168 Nevertheless, the 
neighborhood model is the favorite of many parents169 and op-
ponents of forced school integration.170  
 
 163. See Jan, supra note 157 (reporting an increase in racial imbalance and 
quoting the Cambridge superintendent as saying socioeconomic status “is im-
perfect”). 
 164. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 
(1971) (“All things being equal, . . . it might well be desirable to assign pupils 
to schools nearest their homes.”). 
 165. See Patrick James McQuillan & Kerry Suzanne Englert, The Return to 
Neighborhood Schools, Concentrated Poverty, and Educational Opportunity: 
An Agenda for Reform, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 739, 743 (2001) (relating the 
appeal of neighborhood schools with the perceived drawbacks of busing); Su-
san Olzak et al., School Desegregation, Interracial Exposure, and Antibusing 
Activity in Contemporary Urban America, 100 AM. J. SOC. 196, 217 (1994) (de-
scribing the antibusing protests between 1970 and 1990 including meetings, 
picketing, boycotts, and riots). 
 166. See, e.g., Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 2, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915) [hereinafter 553 Social Scientists] 
(arguing that the body of research since Brown shows that the racial demo-
graphics of schools are linked to educational benefits). 
 167. See Nelson, supra note 13, at 307 (noting that residential segregation 
will lead to school segregation in communities that adopt the neighborhood 
model). 
 168. See Orfield, supra note 77, at 291 (noting that every community stu-
died in his book faces a “continuous expansion of residential segregation”). 
 169. See, e.g., Pereira, supra note 11 (analyzing a school-integration dis-
pute that pits white parents against school officials and minority parents); cf. 
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For those who consider racial diversity a compelling go-
vernmental interest, the neighborhood model may be an appro-
priate solution only if school district boundaries give adequate 
concern for the racial divisions prevalent in many American 
communities.171 Thus, drawing boundaries to maximize diversi-
ty through a process known as “redistricting” is occasionally 
championed as a way around the race dilemma,172 and even 
supported by Justice Kennedy.173 However, redistricting strug-
gles to overcome the phenomenon of “white flight”174 and re-
mains a judicially unstable proposition.175 
Even with feasible and constitutional redistricting tools 
available, the neighborhood model is a proven failure when it 
comes to student achievement. Geography-based school as-
signment plans such as the neighborhood model increase se-
gregation, which directly relates to lower student achieve-
ment.176 Research on school systems that use the neighborhood 
 
Jacqueline Reis, State’s Educators Revisit Deseg Issue: Recent Supreme Court 
Ruling Limits Alternatives, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester, Massachu-
setts), Jul. 18, 2007, at B1 (quoting Worcester, Massachusetts Superintendent 
James A. Caradonio as claiming that redistricting may be “‘as divisive for 
some people as forced busing (in Boston) was’”). 
 170. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
127 S. Ct. 2738, 2775, 2778 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
“essential elements” of integration are not compelling, and that the relation-
ship between forced integration and achievement is “tenuous”). 
 171. See id. at 2972 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting the consideration 
of neighborhood demographics in drawing school attendance zones as one 
permissible solution to achieving integration). See generally Boger, supra note 
128, at 1402 (characterizing seventy-four American metropolitan areas as 
“hypersegregated,” and another 160 as “partially segregated”); Orfield, supra 
note 77, (describing the “continuous expansion of residential segregation” 
across America).  
 172. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 14, at 2048 n.253 (arguing that redistrict-
ing in order to accomplish integrated schooling would not be subject to the 
same level of scrutiny as other race-based classifications). 
 173. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that school districts may consider the racial demographics of at-
tendance zones when drawing boundaries). 
 174. See Orfield, supra note 77, at 314–18 (discussing desegregation prob-
lems of white suburbanization that can lead to school systems composed of vir-
tually all minorities). 
 175. See Chapin Cimino, Comment, Class-Based Preferences in Affirmative 
Action Programs After Miller v. Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option, or Subter-
fuge?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1289, 1297–301 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s redistricting cases preclude race-neutral affirmative action policies in 
education); cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647–48 (1993) (describing the 
Court’s discomfort with racial gerrymandering in the context of voter reappor-
tionment). 
 176. See 553 Social Scientists, supra note 166, at 13, app. at 47 n.153. 
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model after completing desegregation mandates confirm this 
fact. In Charlotte-Mecklenburg, for example, the school district 
attained “unitary” status following court-ordered desegrega-
tion, returned to the neighborhood model, and quickly exhibited 
declines in student achievement.177 Denver and San Francisco 
have reported similar results.178 In short, the neighborhood 
model cannot achieve the dream of educational equity.179 
C. THE KITCHEN SINK APPROACH: A DISTRICT’S PIECEMEAL 
RACE-NEUTRAL EFFORT 
As no single race-neutral solution comprehensively ad-
dresses a race-based problem, some commentators and school 
districts attack the integration dilemma with a combination of 
proposals.180 In 1999, the San Francisco Unified School District 
instituted a student assignment policy that eliminated race-
based classifications in favor of a variety of race-neutral factors 
including socioeconomic status, geographic proximity, and aca-
demic achievement, among many others.181 Unfortunately, the 
results have not been successful: San Francisco schools consi-
dered “highly diverse” based on the new factors were found to 
be the least racially diverse schools in the district.182 Moreover, 
previously attained levels of integration declined, and schools 
that resegregated scored the lowest on state standardized 
tests.183 At San Francisco’s Lowell High, which gave bonus 
points to students coming from single-parent families, propor-
tional enrollment of white and Chinese students increased.184  
 
 177. See id. at 14. 
 178. See id. app. at 52–54 (describing the immediate adverse changes in 
diversity and achievement following the Denver School District’s discarding of 
its use of race in student assignment and the “unsuccessful” attempt of San 
Francisco to adopt race-neutral factors in the place of its use of race in as-
signment); see also McQuillan & Englert, supra note 165, at 750–51 (summa-
rizing data that show significant disparities in numerous achievement indica-
tors between students in segregated schools following Denver’s return to the 
neighborhood model). 
 179. See Nelson, supra note 13, at 310 (arguing that continued adherence 
to the neighborhood model will prohibit minority students from receiving the 
same quality of education as their nonminority peers). 
 180. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 14, at 2049–50 (discussing several race-
neutral factors that may contribute to racial diversity, including some factors 
implemented or considered in various American cities). 
 181. 553 Social Scientists, supra note 166, app. at 53. 
 182. Id. app. at 53–54. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See Diller, supra note 14, at 2051. 
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Given the importance of the battle, there will always be 
new proposals for improving public education. Race-neutral so-
lutions to a race-based problem have failed to address school 
segregation and ignore the threat faced by millions of school-
children. As Justice Kennedy has suggested, the Constitution 
must not turn its back on resegregation, and school districts 
must not be compelled to accept racial isolation.185 
III.  A CONSTITUTIONAL RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT 
ASSIGNMENT PLAN   
The law must not force school districts to choose between 
either defending race-conscious assignment plans from the fo-
reseeable onslaught of costly litigation bolstered by Parents In-
volved or using race-neutral alternatives that do not achieve in-
tegration, and thus student achievement. Despite the early 
reaction of the media and scholarly commentators, and the 
strong language of the plurality and Justice Thomas,186 the Su-
preme Court has not destroyed all race-based solutions to 
achieving the compelling interest of racial diversity in K–12 
public education. In fact, at least five justices support local 
school officials who desire to reverse the resegregation trend by 
using race-based criteria.187 Rather than backtracking into the 
failed race-neutral models, school districts should continue to 
use race in school assignment according to Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in Parents Involved, in which he encouraged districts to 
pursue narrowly tailored means to the important goal of diver-
sity.188  
The solution is within reach of all American school dis-
tricts. Race-based solutions can adequately conform to the plu-
rality’s objections. This Part details the limitations of the hold-
ing in Parents Involved, specifically addressing the principal 
concerns that swayed the plurality and led Justice Kennedy to 
 
 185. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. 
Ct. 2738, 2791 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (deriding the plurality’s ap-
parent dismissal of the problem of de facto segregation and rejecting the idea 
that local school officials must accept the status quo). 
 186. See, e.g., id. at 2768 (plurality opinion) (declaring the way to end ra-
cial discrimination is to end racial discrimination); id. (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(comparing the arguments of the dissenters to those of segregationists in the 
1950s). 
 187. See id. at 2835 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing out that five justices 
agree that local school officials have a compelling interest in racial diversity). 
 188. Id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reinforcing that diversity is a 
compelling interest and suggesting that school boards pursue such a goal). 
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his reluctant disapproval of the specific Seattle and Louisville 
plans.189 The legal framework outlined in Parents Involved 
translates into real policies that will shape the lives of millions 
of American schoolchildren. This Part reinforces the goal of in-
tegration and argues that school districts need not fear the 
public’s initial misinterpretation of the expected impact of Par-
ents Involved. Additionally, this Part includes examples of race-
neutral programs that may contribute not only to race-
conscious assignment policies, but also to the solution. School 
districts following the guidelines detailed below can adopt the 
narrowly tailored means to enact powerful integration strate-
gies so that all children will one day enjoy educational equity.  
A. OVERCOMING THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS OF THE PLURALITY 
IN PARENTS INVOLVED 
Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion is likely to be re-
membered most for its catchy, tautological conclusion: “The 
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop dis-
criminating on the basis of race.”190 Its support, however, does 
not rest on such an uncontestable truism. The Chief Justice—
and the three justices who joined his opinion—gained the cru-
cial vote of Justice Kennedy by focusing on three main weak-
nesses of the individual plans implemented in Seattle and 
Louisville.191 These weaknesses are specific to the Seattle and 
Louisville plans, and not to race-based classifications in other 
models of K–12 student assignment.192 Addressing these con-
cerns will significantly restrict the impact of the plurality’s 
holding, and consequently conform to the constitutional para-
meters of the limiting concurrence and the five justices who 
continue to realize the value of integrated education.193  
 
 189. See id. at 2791 (describing an inability to support the plurality’s “pro-
foundly mistaken” apparent conclusion that school authorities must accept ra-
cial isolation). 
 190. Id. at 2768 (plurality opinion). 
 191. See id. at 2788–91 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (concurring with the plu-
rality to the extent that it holds that the specific plans at issue fail to meet the 
heavy burden of strict scrutiny). 
 192. See id. at 2789 (clarifying that school districts may use race-based 
classifications but only when they are narrowly tailored to the compelling in-
terest in avoiding racial isolation). 
 193. See id. at 2835 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that a majority of jus-
tices believe local school officials have a compelling interest in achieving racial 
diversity). 
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It is worthwhile to mention that a school assignment pro-
gram may be constitutionally sound even if it does not address 
all three of the plurality’s main concerns. It may have been the 
unique combination of all three flaws that struck the fatal blow 
to the plans in the eyes of Justice Kennedy. For the sake of be-
ing comprehensive, however, this Note assumes that the Court 
would require that all three of the below-mentioned concerns be 
satisfied. 
1. School Districts Must Broaden Their Notion of Racial 
Diversity 
Cognizant of America’s troubled history with racial classi-
fications, the plurality and Justice Kennedy took particular ex-
ception to Seattle and Louisville’s “binary conception of race.”194 
In other words, five justices were not able to accept a racial 
classification that groups individuals as “white/nonwhite” or 
“black/other.”195 Fortunately, this problem is easily resolved: 
school systems should identify all races in their assignment 
programs. There should be more than two options when a child 
notes his or her race on enrollment documents. School officials 
should give adequate allowance to the value of multiple races. 
Compiling this simple data is no more burdensome than com-
piling white/nonwhite or black/other data, and it is presently 
legally mandated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.196 In fact, the 
United States Department of Education has been collecting 
enrollment data as it relates to race in public elementary and 
secondary schools since 1968.197 It may well be that in certain 
districts all nonwhite students receive a preference in practice, 
but such a result is less objectionable if the students are given 
accurate consideration for their specific race.198  
 
 194. Id. at 2760 (plurality opinion). 
 195. See id. at 2790–91 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing with the plural-
ity in faulting the district’s “blunt distinction” between racial identifiers). 
 196. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, §§ 601–02, 78 
Stat. 252 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2006)) (prohibiting dis-
crimination in federally assisted programs and requiring each federal depart-
ment to issue rules, regulations, or orders consistent with the objectives of the 
Act); Compliance Information, 34 C.F.R. § 100.6(b) (2007) (requiring recipients 
of federal financial assistance to make racial and ethnic data available to the 
Department of Education for purposes of compliance with Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964). 
 197. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education, About OCR and 
Surveys, http://vistademo.beyond2020.com/ocr2004rv30/wdswho.html (last vi-
sited Mar. 9, 2009). 
 198. Cf. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760 (criticizing classifications that 
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2.  Racial Proportionality Has No Place in an Educational 
Setting 
Seattle and Louisville assigned their diversity goals for 
each school according to the racial make-up of the school dis-
trict as a whole.199 This decision, according to the plurality, 
proves that the respective school boards were not interested in 
attaining any educational benefits of racial diversity by imple-
menting their assignment programs.200 As a result, the plans 
failed the narrow-tailoring prong of the Court’s strict scrutiny 
analysis.201  
Again, this lapse is easy to correct. If the plans are peda-
gogically—as opposed to demographically—driven, they would 
be tailored to the school’s asserted compelling interest of 
achieving racial diversity. Therefore, school systems must ab-
andon the use of strict district-wide percentages of minority 
enrollment that drove the invalidated plans at issue. In place of 
these arguably irrational percentages, the school board may 
cite any number of studies that support the proposition that 
students achieve greater academic gains in diverse educational 
settings.202 If necessary, and dependent on budgetary con-
straints, school districts may wish to commission their own pe-
dagogical studies to identify the level of diversity most benefi-
cial to their students.  
3. Racial Classifications Must Be of Limited Duration 
By tying their racial guidelines to the school systems’ de-
mographics, Seattle and Louisville created problematic racial 
classifications because the plans had “‘no logical stopping 
point.’”203 The Supreme Court has held that race-conscious pol-
icies must serve as temporary solutions terminable as soon as 
 
differentiate only between white/nonwhite or black/other as “binary” and 
“crude”); id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (same). 
 199. Id. at 2755–56 (plurality opinion).  
 200. See id.  
 201. See id. 
 202. Numerous studies are readily available to confirm that racial diversity 
is beneficial in public education. See, e.g., id. at 2821 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(citing “well established” evidence confirming the correlation between racial 
integration and student achievement); Liu, supra note 38, at 290 (discussing 
the relationship between racial segregation and educational inequity); Orfield, 
supra note 84, at 65–67 (describing the “achievement inequalities” associated 
with segregated schooling). 
 203. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2758 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989)). 
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practicable.204 The Court conceded, however, that self-
administered “sunset provisions” or periodic reviews of the 
temporarily constitutional action would satisfy strict scruti-
ny.205 Neither Seattle nor Louisville was able to satisfactorily 
define a point at which the racial impositions would no longer 
be necessary.206 In fact, on their face, the plans appeared to the 
plurality to be granted infinite duration—as the school systems’ 
demographics changed, so too would the racial guidelines that 
determined the qualities of the assignment programs.207 This 
characteristic gave the plurality yet another reason to object to 
an unnecessarily broad means to achieving a worthy end.208 
However, infinite duration is not an essential component of 
any race-conscious school assignment program. This quality 
may well have been an unintentional consequence or simple 
oversight of assignment plans. School officials have no reason 
to favor racial preferences in an otherwise diverse system. It is 
not plausible that Seattle or Louisville would continue to ex-
pend valuable resources on the implementation of a race-
conscious assignment policy if their schools ceased to suffer 
from the vestiges of segregation. Indeed, Seattle conducted an-
nual reviews of its integration tiebreaker, adopting appropriate 
changes along the way and a statement justifying the contin-
ued use of its diversity rationale.209 In 2000, the school board 
even concluded that the integration tiebreaker would no longer 
apply if the racial composition of the affected schools returned 
to an acceptable level.210 This apparently was not enough to sa-
tisfy the plurality, especially given the breadth of the plan as 
initially adopted.  
School officials have multiple options available to conform 
to the plurality’s demands. First, a race-conscious assignment 
policy with a definite ending date—twenty-five years, for ex-
ample—may be an obvious starting point. Having already ac-
 
 204. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (upholding a 
race-conscious higher education affirmative action policy as it was “limited in 
time”); Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (requiring that a race-conscious minority con-
tractor set-aside program be no more than a “deviation from the norm of equal 
treatment of all racial and ethnic groups” and “a temporary matter”). 
 205. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. 
 206. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2758. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See id.  
 209. Brief for Respondents at 7–8, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (No. 
05-908). 
 210. Id. at 11. 
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cepted a twenty-five year window for a policy with a similar 
goal of racial diversity at the University of Michigan Law 
School, the Court would be hard-pressed to object to such a li-
miting provision here.211  
As a second option, school officials may wish to mandate 
periodic reviews, as suggested by Justice O’Connor in Grutter212 
and performed by the Seattle school district although apparent-
ly too late to overcome the plan’s “fatal flaw[s].”213 For example, 
such a policy may explicitly state: “Race-conscious school as-
signments shall immediately cease upon compliance with the 
clearly identified goal as realized upon a review to be conducted 
without exception on an annual basis. Failure to conduct an 
annual review shall be acceptance of the achievement of this 
policy’s objectives.” Such reviews provide clearly defined tem-
poral parameters that would assure the plurality that the poli-
cy will end as soon as the district achieves its compelling inter-
est.  
A third alternative that would simultaneously alleviate 
concerns of the policy’s relationship to racial balancing is to re-
quire the school board to cease the race-conscious assignment 
policy after reaching a certain measure of student achievement. 
For example, the policy may automatically terminate when 
eighty percent of students are at or above grade level standards 
in reading and math, or some other academic measurement 
that the individual district deems appropriate. The beneficial 
measurement does not even need a specific definition as long as 
 
 211. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (providing the law 
school twenty-five years in which to use racial preferences to achieve its com-
pelling interest). The fact that Grutter concerned an admissions program in 
higher education should be irrelevant to the concern of tailoring a solution of 
limited duration. Chief Justice Roberts’s insistence that Grutter was “unique 
to institutions of higher education” referred specifically to the issue of whether 
diversity in elementary and secondary schools was a compelling governmental 
interest. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2754.  
 212. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (“[T]he durational requirement can be 
met by . . . periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still 
necessary.”). 
 213. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 
F.3d 1162, 1192 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (holding that 
Seattle’s plan meets the durational requirements of Grutter because of the dis-
trict’s annual reviews). Chief Justice Roberts does not mention Seattle’s an-
nual reviews, but nevertheless declares the plan to have “no logical stopping 
point” because of its tie to demographics. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2758. 
The “fatal flaw,” according to Chief Justice Roberts, is the plan’s propensity to 
seek an impermissible racial balance. Id. at 2757. 
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the district considers it a “meaningful number.”214 If the schools 
resegregate and student achievement drops, the districts 
should be free to reinstate the race-conscious measures. 
Such a goal has inherent ties to pedagogical standards, 
which is a priority for the Court.215 It also addresses the prima-
ry reason for desegregation in the first place—segregated 
schools deny racial minorities an equal education. Of course, 
eighty percent of students learning on grade level will be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to reach in a segregated environment.216 
Therefore, there is little worry that such a program will ever 
deny students the important purposes of public education other 
than student achievement.217 In short, if eighty percent of stu-
dents are receiving the education they demand and deserve, the 
schools are likely to be racially integrated and thus achieving 
their objectives.  
B. FACTORS IN ADDITION TO RACE-CONSCIOUS POLICIES THAT 
BENEFIT DIVERSITY AND AFFORD INDIVIDUALIZED 
CONSIDERATION 
Race-neutral alternatives to the common goal of integra-
tion are unlikely to improve the racial diversity of our public 
schools if race is not at least a concurrent factor.218 However, 
race-neutral considerations do have the potential to contribute 
to the overall solution of achieving beneficial racial diversity in 
K–12 public education.219 From the outset, the implementation 
of race-neutral diversity factors demonstrates an assignment 
policy’s individualized consideration of students that the Court 
 
 214. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2757 (citing Grutter ’s approval of a 
school’s goal to achieve an undefined “meaningful number” of minority stu-
dents necessary to achieve beneficial diversity). 
 215. See id. at 2755 (finding both plans to be flawed because they were tied 
to racial demographics as opposed to pedagogic concepts that maximize educa-
tional benefits). 
 216. See, e.g., Orfield, supra note 84, at 65 (describing segregation and low 
achievement as “systematically connected”). 
 217. See, e.g., supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 218. See 553 Social Scientists, supra note 166, app. at 41–54 (reporting 
numerous studies showing the ineffectiveness of race-neutral policies in 
achieving racial integration); supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 219. See, e.g., Kahlenberg, supra note 9, at 1555 (arguing that race-neutral 
policies such as socioeconomic integration “can produce a substantial racial 
dividend”); Nelson, supra note 13, at 328 (encouraging school districts to im-
plement race-neutral policies as the first step in addressing racial segregation 
and educational inequity). 
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has previously found to be so vital.220 Numerous possibilities 
are available to school officials.221 Some may be prohibitively 
burdensome on scarce school resources,222 while others may re-
quire simple data collection that is likely to be readily available 
on existing school enrollment applications. The following alter-
natives have been proposed or implemented with high hopes for 
success.  
1. Magnet Schools 
Magnet schools typically offer distinct curricula organized 
around a special theme such as arts or music programs.223 Dis-
tricts design these schools to attract students from within the 
school district who would normally choose or be assigned to a 
neighborhood school.224 In many districts, white students are 
enticed back to segregated schools in low-income communities 
by the opening or increased funding of attractive magnet 
schools.225 Instead of transferring high-poverty students to 
middle class suburbs, districts may draw students in the oppo-
site direction. A district that actively supports magnet schools 
can show that it seeks to achieve racial diversity through race-
neutral means with pedagogical intentions. This is a laudable 
objective to even the plurality in Parents Involved.226 
2. Texas’s Ten-Percent Plan 
Texas and Florida implemented policies that reserve space 
in state universities for students in the top percentage of their 
 
 220. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319–20 
(1978) (describing the “fatal flaw” of a race-based affirmative action program 
to be the failure to make individualized decisions); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 337 (2003) (approving the university’s policy affording an “individua-
lized consideration to applicants of all races”). 
 221. See supra Part II. 
 222. See Diller, supra note 14, at 2017–18 (“Using this sort of admissions 
process, however, is likely to be cost-prohibitive and administratively infeasi-
ble for a public school, requiring a very large investment of time and resources 
into reviewing applicants’ files.”). 
 223. Kahlenberg, supra note 9, at 1552; Kimberly C. West, Note, A Dese-
gregation Tool That Backfired: Magnet Schools and Classroom Segregation, 
103 YALE L.J. 2567, 2568 (1994). 
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high school class.227 Proponents encourage similar strategies at 
the junior and high school level, whereby a certain percentage 
of seats in selective or otherwise attractive public schools would 
be reserved for the top students (regardless of race) coming 
from feeder schools.228 In order to maximize the impact on di-
versity, districts may hold those reserved spots only for the top 
students in highly segregated schools.229 For example, consider 
a high-achieving, predominantly white high school in a highly 
segregated district. By holding positions in this school for the 
top ten percent of all students at a junior high school that hap-
pens to be ninety percent minority, the district can take advan-
tage of its own segregation without the need to classify stu-
dents based on race. Accordingly, this plan is race-neutral, but 
it may achieve race dividends in certain districts that are able 
to draw on currently segregated schools. Indeed, Texas and 
Florida report early success at increasing minority enrollment 
in their respective state university systems.230 
3. Preference to English Language Learners and Single 
Parent Families 
San Francisco unsuccessfully tried giving preference to 
students coming from single parent families;231 however, such a 
policy may be feasible in certain communities, and it should not 
be ruled out as one of many possible factors that may contri-
bute to a broad conception of diversity. English language profi-
ciency is also likely to be a strong predictor of race, and has 
been attempted in Arlington, Virginia, and considered in San 
Francisco.232 Of course, this solution does not focus on the Afri-
can-American community; however, it may provide another 
signal that the school district implementing such a policy is not 
seeking to favor a single race and instead looks to achieve 
broader diversity.  
These and other innovative race-neutral factors serve two 
purposes. First and foremost, they help to pacify the plurality’s 
criticism of race-conscious student assignment policies by ex-
 
 227. Diller, supra note 14, at 2052.  
 228. Id. at 2053. 
 229. See id.  
 230. Id. at 2052–53. 
 231. Id. at 2051 (describing a policy tried at San Francisco’s Lowell High 
aimed at increasing racial diversity that resulted in increasing white and Chi-
nese enrollment at the expense of black and Latino applicants). 
 232. Id. at 2049–50 n.255. 
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pressing a clear intent to address the problem of discrimination 
on the basis of race by avoiding discrimination on the basis of 
race. Second, certain race-neutral factors have the potential to 
benefit diversity in certain communities. Of course, in the end 
it remains the case that the best way to address the race-based 
problem is through race-based remedies. This fact cannot be 
overlooked. 
  CONCLUSION   
After the promise of Brown gave Dr. King and millions of 
Americans hope for a better tomorrow, America finds itself in a 
familiar predicament: public education is increasingly segre-
gated, leaving millions of children behind and our future in jeo-
pardy. The plurality opinion in Parents Involved denies the at-
tempts by two school districts to increase racial diversity and 
student achievement. Fortunately, Justice Kennedy’s concur-
rence significantly limits this opinion and reaffirms the compel-
ling government interest in achieving racial diversity in the 
public schools. As thousands of school boards across America 
ponder the impact of Parents Involved, districts should openly 
accept Justice Kennedy’s challenge to reach for the dream of 
diversity in our public schools by using the only means known 
to work: race-conscious student assignment policies. By broa-
dening the concept of diversity beyond a simple dichotomous 
standard, defining diversity so as to maximize student benefits, 
and adopting parameters for temporal limitations, race-
conscious policies can satisfy the Supreme Court and our moral 
and ethical obligations to our children. Segregation doesn’t 
have to be on the rise. Minorities don’t have to be left behind. 
Race is not dead, and the promise of Brown can survive.  
